The Case for Functional Dismissal: Why the Impeachment Complaint Against VP Sara Duterte Must End with the 19th Congress

 By Atty. Arnedo S. Valera

I do not usually agree with the position of my Ateneo Law School classmate and dear friend, Senator Francis Tolentino—who, regrettably, did not make it in the recent senatorial midterm elections. But on the matter of “functional dismissal” of the impeachment complaint against Vice President Sara Duterte, he is absolutely right.

The assertion that no “functional dismissal” occurs in an impeachment trial when Congress adjourns sine die and the case remains unresolved is fundamentally flawed—both in terms of constitutional structure and jurisprudential history. Senator Tolentino’s position that the impeachment complaint must be tried and resolved before the adjournment of the 19th Congress on June 30 is doctrinally sound. It is consistent with the principles of legal continuity, procedural due process, and democratic accountability.

This column is a respectful rebuttal to those who claim otherwise.

I. Impeachment Jurisdiction Ends with the Life of Congress

One of the most glaring fallacies in the contrary view is the assumption that the Senate’s power to try impeachments survives the adjournment of Congress. That is a dangerous misconception. Impeachment is a sui generis proceeding—neither fully judicial nor entirely legislative, but a political act bounded by the life cycle of the legislative body that initiates it.

Article XI, Section 3(6) of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

“The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.”

But this power is neither infinite nor institutionalized across Congresses. It exists only while the Senate is constituted under a specific Congress. Once Congress adjourns sine die, the impeachment court dissolves with it. There is no constitutional mechanism to carry over an incomplete impeachment trial into a new Congress without re-filing and restarting the entire process.

This is not just theory. In Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261 (Nov. 10, 2003), the Supreme Court emphasized the unique nature of impeachment and the jurisdictional time-bar designed to prevent its misuse. Courts operate continuously; Congresses do not. There is no “jurisdiction surviving the adjournment” in political impeachment proceedings.

II. Impeachment Follows the Legislative Calendar, Not Judicial Permanence

Under the Senate Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Trials (2011), the Senate convenes as an impeachment court only upon receipt of the Articles of Impeachment. It sits pursuant to the legislative calendar. There is no constitutional or procedural rule allowing the trial to continue across different Congresses without specific reauthorization.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), held that impeachment is a political question governed by legislative—not judicial—rules. U.S. Congressional practice, as reflected in Jefferson’s Manual, is unequivocal: when Congress adjourns, all pending impeachment matters lapse unless reintroduced.

Similarly, in People v. Jalosjos, G.R. No. 132875 (Feb. 3, 2000), the Philippine Supreme Court underscored the binding nature of procedural limitations on political functions. Rules matter. Calendars matter. Constitutional discipline matters.

III. Functional Dismissal Prevents Political Weaponization

What is at stake here is not just one complaint against one Vice President. What is at stake is the very integrity of constitutional processes. If we allow impeachment complaints to float from one Congress to the next without formal re-initiation, we normalize perpetual political harassment under the guise of “accountability.”

Each Congress is a sovereign political entity. One cannot bind the next. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), the Supreme Court ruled that:

“Each department of the government is supreme within its own sphere.”

A 20th Congress cannot inherit, by default, an unresolved complaint from the 19th. It must initiate a new process, deliberate anew, and reconstitute its authority. Otherwise, we sanction a regime of political retribution cloaked in pseudo-legal continuity.

Functional dismissal is not a loophole—it is a constitutional firewall. It ensures that impeachment is not used as an endless political sword but as a solemn, time-bound remedy of last resort.

IV. Accountability Must Obey Constitutional Boundaries

Some argue that dismissing the complaint purely because of procedural expiration undermines public accountability. That argument misunderstands both accountability and procedure. The Constitution provides for impeachment not as a continuous threat, but as a defined process with built-in safeguards.

Accountability is not license for procedural abuse. It does not authorize ignoring deadlines, skipping due process, or defying institutional boundaries.

As Senator Tolentino aptly warned, the weaponization of impeachment risks turning a mechanism of accountability into a tool for political instability. The expiration of the 19th Congress is not a technicality—it is a constitutional sunset.

 Upholding the Constitution, Not Partisan Convenience

The impeachment complaint against Vice President Sara Duterte must be dismissed both de jure and de facto if not tried by June 30, 2025. Functional dismissal is not just valid—it is necessary. It protects the Senate’s institutional integrity, respects the constitutional calendar, and shields public officials from prolonged political persecution.

Let us not distort accountability into vengeance. Let us not warp our constitutional rules to serve partisan convenience. In impeachment, as in all matters of state, finality and fairness must walk hand in hand.

Senator Tolentino’s view is more than opinion. It is a defense of constitutional order.