The Right to Move for Dismissal: Why the Senate Sitting as an Impeachment Court Can Dismiss a Politically Motivated Complaint

 By: Atty. Arnedo S. Valera

As debates intensify over the impeachment proceedings against Vice President Sara Duterte, a key constitutional and procedural question has emerged: Can the Senate, even when constituted as an impeachment court, move—either motu proprio or through a senator-member acting as impeachment judge—to dismiss the articles of impeachment outright?

Former Senate President and now Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Juan Ponce Enrile has criticized Senator Ronald "Bato" dela Rosa for expressing openness to such a move. Enrile insists that the Senate, when convened as an impeachment court, cannot summarily dismiss a complaint, claiming this violates the principle of due process. However, a closer reading of both Philippine constitutional law and comparative U.S. jurisprudence reveals that a dismissal is not only possible but grounded in legal precedent—particularly when the impeachment complaint is manifestly insufficient in form or substance, politically weaponized, or fails to meet constitutional thresholds.

I. The Senate as Impeachment Court: A Political Tribunal with Judicial Standards

Under Article XI, Section 3(6) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the Senate has the “sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.” Once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted by the House of Representatives, the Senate assumes a quasi-judicial function as an impeachment court. However, it retains its character as a political body—its jurisdiction is not identical to regular courts of law. Hence, it is not bound by the same technical rules of criminal or civil procedure, although it must still observe substantive due process and the fundamental tenets of fairness.

This is echoed in Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261 (Nov. 10, 2003), where the Supreme Court acknowledged that impeachment is a “political process with judicial overtones.” In this case, while the Court restrained further proceedings due to a constitutional defect (violating the one-year bar rule), it clarified that the Senate's impeachment jurisdiction must be exercised within constitutional bounds.

II. Legal Basis for Dismissal by the Senate Sitting as an Impeachment Court

Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Senate, acting as an impeachment court, from evaluating whether the Articles of Impeachment are fatally defective on their face, whether due to lack of jurisdictional facts, insufficiency in substance, or violations of constitutional limits.

Just as regular courts may dismiss cases for lack of merit on the pleadings, the Senate likewise retains inherent procedural authority to dismiss an impeachment complaint when:

1. The House has failed to sufficiently allege an impeachable offense under Article XI, Section 2, or

2. The complaint is based on political vendetta, abuse of process, or is not justiciable under constitutional standards.

In Topacio v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 221302 (March 20, 2018), the Supreme Court ruled that the Senate possesses broad internal rules to govern its proceedings, and courts must respect such independence. This applies even more stringently when the Senate constitutes itself as an impeachment court.

Furthermore, under Section 3(8) of Article XI, “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” These rules allow the Senate to address motions to dismiss, suspend proceedings, or remand defective articles. No rule strips it of the power to dismiss on constitutional or procedural grounds.

III. Comparative Insight from U.S. Impeachment Jurisprudence

Under U.S. constitutional practice, which serves as a persuasive model for the Philippine impeachment system, the Senate may summarily dismiss an impeachment complaint, particularly when it lacks factual basis or is politically abusive.

In the 1936 case of Judge Halsted Ritter, the U.S. Senate dismissed several articles of impeachment for failure to state grounds that rise to the constitutional level of “high crimes and misdemeanors.” Similarly, in the impeachment cases of Judges Harry Claiborne (1986) and Alcee Hastings (1989), certain articles were rejected at the threshold phase before trial.

The U.S. Senate rules on impeachment allow for a “motion to dismiss” prior to the evidentiary phase—a discretionary power vested in the Senate sitting as a political tribunal.

Thus, Senator dela Rosa’s proposal is not a ‘no-no’ but is a constitutionally permissible act of discretion, echoing the Senate's authority to prevent a weaponization of impeachment.

IV. Guarding Against Political Weaponization of Impeachment

Impeachment is not a political vendetta. It is a constitutional safety valve designed to protect public accountability. But when misused, it becomes a bludgeon to punish political opponents or destroy reputations without legal cause.

To preserve the integrity of impeachment as an institution, the Senate must have the power to defend itself against misuse by dismissing patently frivolous or constitutionally defective complaints. Indeed, to allow every flawed impeachment case to proceed to full trial would trivialize the process and strain democratic institutions.

As the late Chief Justice Renato Corona emphasized in his 2012 impeachment trial, "An impeachment trial is not a fishing expedition. It must be based on a clear, factual, and legal basis.”

V. The Power to Dismiss Is a Shield for Due Process

There is neither constitutional prohibition nor procedural restriction against a senator or group of senators moving to dismiss an impeachment complaint before full trial. On the contrary, such a move may be necessary to uphold constitutional safeguards, prevent abuse of process, and protect high public officials from political persecution.

Thus, Senator dela Rosa’s position, far from violating legal ethics or process, reflects a legally grounded and constitutionally sound response to an impeachment complaint that—based on current available evidence—appears to lack both factual basis and constitutional merit.

If the Senate must sit as a court, it must also act as one—with the authority to dismiss baseless complaints and preserve the integrity of the constitutional order.

Let impeachment not be a circus. Let it be a process of justice—not vengeance.

Atty. Arnedo S. Valera is the executive director of the Global Migrant Heritage Foundation and managing attorney at Valera & Associates, a US immigration and anti-discrimination law firm for over 32 years. He holds a master’s degree in International Affairs and International Law and Human Rights from Columbia University and was trained at the International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. He obtained his Bachelor of Laws from Ateneo de Manila University.  He is an AB-Philosophy Major at the University  of Santo Tomas ( UST). He is a professor at San Beda Graduate School of Law (LLM Program), teaching International Security and Alliances.