Judicial Review and the Bounds of Legislative Power: In Defense of the Supreme Court’s Oversight on Impeachment Proceedings.

 By Atty. Arnedo S. Valera

Introduction

The Supreme Court's recent directive requiring the House of Representatives to submit records, deliberations, and related documentation on the impeachment complaint against Vice President Sara Duterte has sparked intense debate. Critics, including former Representative and Justice Secretary Leila de Lima, have denounced the Court’s action as judicial overreach. However, this article contends that the Supreme Court acted well within its constitutional mandate. Far from encroaching on the prerogatives of a co-equal branch, the Court is performing its solemn duty to protect constitutional integrity, procedural regularity, and the rule of law.

This essay draws upon the 1987 Philippine Constitution, leading Philippine jurisprudence, and instructive U.S. constitutional case law to argue that judicial oversight over impeachment procedures is both legitimate and necessary when grave abuse of discretion is alleged.

I. Judicial Review Under the 1987 Constitution: A Constitutional Imperative

The fundamental charter of the Philippines is unambiguous:

> “Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice… to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.”

(Art. VIII, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution)

This expanded definition of judicial power, unique to the 1987 Constitution in the post-Marcos democratic restoration, was deliberately crafted to prevent tyranny cloaked in legality. It applies without exception to all branches, including Congress, even in the exercise of its impeachment powers.

II. Precedent in Philippine Jurisprudence: Impeachment is Not a Legal Black Hole

Two leading cases cement the doctrine that impeachment, while political in nature, is not immune from judicial scrutiny:

A. Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261 (Nov. 10, 2003)

This landmark ruling involved a challenge to the filing of multiple impeachment complaints against then Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. The Court ruled that:

> “The exercise of the power to initiate impeachment is not beyond the reach of judicial review when it is alleged that constitutional limitations have been violated.”

Francisco clarified that the impeachment process must adhere to both the Constitution and the House's internal rules, and failure to do so may be struck down by the Court as an instance of grave abuse of discretion.

B. Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 193459 (Feb. 15, 2011)

This case concerned the consolidation of multiple impeachment complaints against then Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez. The Supreme Court again emphasized its authority to ensure that procedural and constitutional boundaries are observed, holding that:

> “Judicial review is proper where there is a clear showing that Congress gravely abused its discretion.”

Together, these cases obliterate the notion that impeachment is an unreviewable political act.

III. The American Analogy: Limits to Political Question Doctrine

Critics often invoke the U.S. “political question doctrine” to suggest that impeachment is a purely political question. However, U.S. jurisprudence recognizes judicial review in impeachment-adjacent contexts, particularly where constitutional violations are alleged.

A. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)

In Nixon, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the Senate’s procedures in an impeachment trial, holding that it was a nonjusticiable political question. However, the Court notably did not suggest that all aspects of the impeachment process are beyond judicial review. It limited its ruling to Senate trial procedures, not House initiation rules or constitutional violations.

Legal scholars like Professor Laurence Tribe and Dean Erwin Chemerinsky have since clarified that when Congress violates express constitutional provisions, judicial intervention is warranted—even in impeachment.

IV. Legislative Power Under Scrutiny: Checks, Not Supremacy

In the case at bar, the House of Representatives' rushed impeachment complaint against VP Duterte, allegedly pushed through with little deliberation and in potential violation of its own Rules of Impeachment, raises grave constitutional questions.

The Supreme Court’s request for records is not an intrusion; it is a fact-finding mechanism aimed at ascertaining whether Congress complied with its own procedural mandates and constitutional constraints. Without such oversight, Congress could abuse its power unchecked, turning impeachment into a partisan tool rather than a constitutionally mandated remedy.

V. Rule of Law and Transparency: Requiring Submission of Records is an Exercise in Accountability

Accountability begins with transparency. Requiring the House to submit its records aligns with the doctrine of checks and balances. As held in Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777 (April 20, 2006):

> “The doctrine of separation of powers does not mean absolute autonomy. Each department is supreme only within its own sphere.”

Thus, the submission of records is a minimal and reasonable burden on the legislative branch to justify its actions under the Constitution.

The Court as Constitutional Sentinel

Far from judicial overreach, the Supreme Court’s actions embody its constitutional duty as the guardian of legality. The rule of law, not the rule of expediency, must govern the exercise of impeachment powers. When impeachment becomes a weapon of partisan politics, the judiciary must step in to recalibrate the process to its constitutional moorings.

To suggest otherwise is to exalt legislative supremacy over constitutional supremacy, a dangerous proposition in any democratic republic.

Let it be clear: Congress is powerful, but it is not infallible. #

Atty. Arnedo S. Valera is the executive director of the Global Migrant Heritage Foundation and managing attorney at Valera & Associates, a US immigration and anti-discrimination law firm for over 32 years. He holds a master’s degree in International Affairs and International Law and Human Rights from Columbia University and was trained at the International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. He obtained his Bachelor of Laws from Ateneo de Manila University.  He is an AB-Philosophy Major at the University  of Santo Tomas ( UST). He is a professor at San Beda Graduate School of Law (LLM Program), teaching International Security and Alliances