REBUTTING JUSTICE CARPIO’S CRITIQUE OF THE SUPREME COURT’S IMPEACHMENT RULING: A SCHOLARLY AND CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

By: Atty. Arnedo S. Valera

I. Introduction

In a recent statement, former Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio—speaking as a co-convenor of 1Sambayan—categorically challenged the Supreme Court’s landmark decision declaring unconstitutional the impeachment proceedings initiated against Vice President Sara Duterte. His critique centered on two pillars: (1) that the House plenary had already approved the fourth impeachment complaint; and (2) that the Supreme Court erred in retroactively imposing a requirement for plenary hearing and approval prior to valid initiation.

While Justice Carpio’s opinions deserve respectful consideration given his stature, his arguments are constitutionally unsound, jurisprudentially selective, and ultimately flawed when scrutinized under the lens of both Philippine constitutional doctrine and comparative U.S. constitutional law.

This article offers a point-by-point rebuttal to Justice Carpio’s claims, reaffirming the Supreme Court’s role as the final arbiter of constitutional questions and the necessity of procedural due process in all proceedings, including those that are political in nature.

II. The Supreme Court’s Power of Judicial Review Extends to Impeachment

Justice Carpio implies that the High Court should have abstained from determining procedural compliance in the impeachment process. This view is inconsistent with established doctrine. The 1987 Constitution, under Article VIII, Section 1, provides that judicial power includes “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction...”

This expanded power of judicial review—adopted precisely in response to martial law excesses—mandates the Court’s intervention when Congress oversteps or evades its constitutional duties, even in impeachment.

This principle was clearly affirmed in Francisco v. House of Representatives (G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003), where the Supreme Court nullified multiple impeachment complaints filed within a year. The Court did not hesitate to scrutinize internal congressional proceedings when constitutional parameters were breached. The same principle applies today.

III. On the Alleged “Plenary Approval” of the Fourth Complaint

Justice Carpio insists that the fourth impeachment complaint was “approved” by the House plenary. However, the official records of the House contradict this claim. There was no final roll call or division of the House explicitly adopting the Committee Report forwarding the complaint to the Senate.

Under Rule III, Section 5 of the House Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Proceedings (2022), such referral must be accompanied by a recorded vote—not presumed or implied.

Moreover, in Enrile v. Senate (G.R. No. 180050, November 14, 2008), the Court held that for acts of Congress to have constitutional effect, they must be completed in accordance with clearly defined procedures. A plenary discussion does not equate to a constitutionally valid referral.

Even Justice Carpio, in Angara v. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139 [1936]), a case he frequently cited during his tenure, recognized that constitutional procedural requirements cannot be dispensed with—even under political exigencies.

IV. The Claim of Retroactivity and “New Requirements” Is Misplaced

Justice Carpio accuses the Supreme Court of retroactively imposing a plenary hearing requirement. This is misleading and legally untenable. The Constitution itself—Article XI, Section 3(2)—provides the following:

> “A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.”

This provision sets out procedural due process and timelines to ensure orderly disposition of impeachment complaints in the House of Representatives. It underscores that initiating impeachment is not a vague political act but a constitutional process with mandatory procedural safeguards against abuse or undue delay.

What the Supreme Court did was not to impose a “new requirement,” but to clarify, pursuant to its judicial function, that such process must be complete—including plenary deliberation and a recorded vote—to comply with Article XI.

Precedents like Tañada v. Cuenco (G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957) establish that constitutional clarifications take immediate effect, especially when designed to halt continuing or future violations. Prospective application is not a shield against grave abuse of discretion.

Even under U.S. constitutional law, courts have affirmed the need for procedural regularity. In United States v. Nixon (418 U.S. 683 [1974]), the Court emphasized that even executive privilege cannot override due process. Similarly, in Clinton v. Jones (520 U.S. 681 [1997]), it held that no branch of government is above constitutional scrutiny.

V. Due Process in Impeachment Is Not Optional

Justice Carpio’s argument that due process should yield to the “sui generis” nature of impeachment misapprehends the nature of constitutional hierarchy. While impeachment is political in its ends, it is constitutional in its means—and thus subject to the minimum requirements of fairness and due process.

Even the framers of the U.S. Constitution, upon which our model is based, recognized this. In Federalist No. 65, Alexander Hamilton warned of the dangers of passion overriding reason in impeachment and emphasized the need for procedural safeguards.

The Philippine constitutional structure mirrors this logic. A valid impeachment must adhere not only to the letter but also to the spirit of the law—anchored in transparency, deliberation, and legality. To say that due process is subordinate to public accountability is to invite mob rule cloaked in constitutional language.

VI. Final Reflections: Constitutional Order Over Political Expediency

Justice Carpio’s intervention, while impassioned, falls into a familiar trap: exalting political ends over constitutional means. But as the U.S. Supreme Court held in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (542 U.S. 507 [2004]), “a state of war is not a blank check for the President.” Likewise, public clamor for accountability is not a blank check for Congress to ignore procedural due process.

The Supreme Court acted within its constitutional mandate to ensure that the impeachment process, though political, is bounded by the rule of law. It clarified—not invented—the requirement of plenary deliberation and vote. This safeguard is essential, not excessive.

Far from being a setback to democracy, the Court’s ruling affirms that no cause—however noble—justifies sacrificing constitutional order. The Constitution is not an instrument of convenience but a solemn covenant between the governed and their government.

Conclusion

Justice Carpio’s criticism, though reflective of a particular political narrative, fails to overcome the controlling constitutional principles and jurisprudence that undergird the Supreme Court’s decision. Impeachment cannot be governed by ad hoc interpretations or political shortcuts.

The Court rightly reaffirmed that even in the most political of processes, the rule of law must prevail.

Let this case stand not as a tale of judicial overreach—but as a reaffirmation that in our Republic, it is the Constitution—not expediency—that reigns supreme. #

Atty. Arnedo S. Valera is the executive director of the Global Migrant Heritage Foundation and managing attorney at Valera & Associates, a US immigration and anti-discrimination law firm for over 32 years. He holds a master’s degree in International Affairs and International Law and Human Rights from Columbia University and was trained at the International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. He obtained his Bachelor of Laws from Ateneo de Manila University.  He is an AB-Philosophy Major at the University  of Santo Tomas ( UST). He is a professor at San Beda Graduate School of Law (LLM Program), teaching International Security and Alliances