RECLAIMING CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE: A SCHOLARLY REBUTTAL TO PHILCONSA’S OFFICIAL STATEMENT ON THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING IN G.R. NO. 278353

By: Atty. Arnedo S. Valera

I. INTRODUCTION

In its July 30, 2025 Official Statement, the Philippine Constitution Association (PhilConsa), through its distinguished Chairman, former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, raised serious concerns over the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sara Z. Duterte v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 278353. While the commitment of PhilConsa to constitutional accountability is laudable, its critique is legally misplaced, constitutionally flawed, and doctrinally inconsistent with both Philippine and U.S. jurisprudence. This scholarly rebuttal reaffirms the Supreme Court's role as the final arbiter of constitutional meaning and upholds the integrity of its ruling as a necessary restraint on political overreach under the 1987 Constitution.

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING OF "INITIATION"—FAITHFUL TO FRANCISCO

PhilConsa's primary contention—that the one-year bar under Article XI, Section 3(5) is inapplicable because the earlier complaints were not “pursued”—misreads both the constitutional text and the controlling precedent in Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261 (2003).

In Francisco, the Supreme Court expressly held:

“The initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of a verified complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee on Justice.”

The “initiation” is a constitutional threshold, not a matter of congressional discretion. It is not the transmittal of Articles to the Senate that constitutes initiation, but the act of referral of a verified complaint to the Committee on Justice. Regardless of whether a complaint is later dismissed or deemed insufficient, the Constitution prohibits the initiation of a second complaint within a year from the first.

The PhilConsa Statement fails to engage with this clear pronouncement. It instead attempts to rewrite Francisco, asserting that initiation requires further action by Congress—an interpretation already rejected by the Court more than two decades ago.

III. THE DANGERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVASION: AVOIDING THE ONE-YEAR BAR BY TECHNICALITY

PhilConsa warns that the Court’s ruling “invites abuse,” as political allies of impeachable officers may file weak complaints to consume the one-year bar. Ironically, this fear presumes bad faith within the legislative branch itself—a concession that constitutional checks are needed.

More importantly, this is a policy argument, not a constitutional one. The Supreme Court is bound to interpret the Constitution as written, not to redesign it based on hypotheticals. As Justice Frankfurter once noted in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952):

 "The Constitution is neither a formula for convenience nor a tool for expediency.”

The one-year bar, like any constitutional safeguard, must apply regardless of the political winds. If the rule is inconvenient, the remedy lies in constitutional amendment—not judicial reinterpretation.

IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW IS NOT JUDICIAL SUPREMACY

PhilConsa characterizes the Court’s decision as an act of judicial activism that disrupts the separation of powers. On the contrary, the ruling embodies judicial fidelity, grounded in Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution:

“Judicial power includes the duty... to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.”

The political question doctrine, long eroded in Philippine constitutional law, cannot be invoked to shield the Legislature from accountability when it violates the Constitution. In Daza v. Singson, G.R. No. 86344 (1989), the Court emphasized:

“The allocation of constitutional boundaries is not a political question. It is a legal one.”

Likewise, in the United States, the Supreme Court held in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), that even the powers of Congress to judge the qualifications of its members are subject to judicial review when they exceed constitutional limits.

The Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 278353 is not judicial overreach—it is the fulfillment of its constitutional mandate to interpret and enforce limits, even against co-equal branches.

V. THE DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE FACT DOES NOT APPLY

PhilConsa’s invocation of the Doctrine of Operative Fact is unavailing. That doctrine, as articulated in De Agbayani v. PNB, G.R. No. L-23127 (1969), and reiterated in League of Cities v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 176951, et al. (2008), applies only to mitigate the effects of a declaration of unconstitutionality on acts performed in good faith under a presumptively valid law or order.

The impeachment proceedings in question were not conducted under a presumptively valid law later declared void. Rather, they proceeded in open disregard of Francisco—a binding precedent. The House was presumed to know the controlling doctrine and chose to ignore it.

Moreover, applying the operative fact doctrine here would constitutionalize a proceeding that was void ab initio—an act the Court has consistently refused to validate. In Demetria v. Alba, G.R. No. 71977 (1988), the Court cautioned:

 “Where the act is void for lack of jurisdiction, the doctrine of operative fact does not apply.”

VI. DUE PROCESS IS NOT MEASURED BY NOTICE ALONE

PhilConsa argues that Vice President Duterte was served, responded, and was heard—and thus due process was not violated. But due process in impeachment is not simply procedural. It includes constitutional regularity—that the proceedings comply with the substantive limitations of the Constitution.

As Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936):

“Due process is not a mere matter of procedure. It is a constitutional safeguard against arbitrary power.”

The initiation of the fourth impeachment complaint violated the one-year bar—a substantive restriction. That alone taints the entire proceeding. The Vice President cannot be forced to defend herself against a void process cloaked in procedural formality.

VII. COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS: US CONSTITUTION AND IMPEACHMENT LIMITS

The United States Constitution, while silent on a one-year rule, enshrines a strict division of roles between the House (power to impeach) and the Senate (power to try). However, judicial review is firmly established as a safeguard against constitutional transgression, even in impeachment-related controversies. In Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the Senate’s mode of trial but reaffirmed that the constitutional boundaries of impeachment may still be judicially reviewable.

Similarly, the Philippine Supreme Court has never disavowed its role in ensuring that impeachment is not weaponized or misused. Francisco and Gutierrez v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 193459 (2011), both underscore the judiciary’s role in guarding against unconstitutional impeachment.

VIII. CONCLUSION: SAFEGUARDING ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL FIDELITY

PhilConsa’s Statement, though impassioned, mistakenly conflates accountability with majoritarianism. Constitutional accountability must operate within the bounds set by the Constitution itself. Impeachment, powerful though it is, is not immune from the Rule of Law.

To protect public officers and the public interest, we must preserve the limits, not dilute them. As Justice Brandeis wisely warned in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928):

“The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachments by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding.”

The Supreme Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 278353 is not a rebuke of accountability. It is a reassertion of constitutional discipline. It is not the judiciary that has overreached, but those who would subvert clear constitutional limits in the name of expediency.

Let us defend the Constitution not merely when it is convenient, but precisely when it is tested. #

Atty. Arnedo S. Valera is the executive director of the Global Migrant Heritage Foundation and managing attorney at Valera & Associates, a US immigration and anti-discrimination law firm for over 32 years. He holds a master’s degree in International Affairs and International Law and Human Rights from Columbia University and was trained at the International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. He obtained his Bachelor of Laws from Ateneo de Manila University.  He is an AB-Philosophy Major at the University  of Santo Tomas ( UST). He is a professor at San Beda Graduate School of Law (LLM Program), teaching International Security and Alliances.