WHEN DOES IMPEACHMENT REALLY BEGIN? A Comparative Constitutional Analysis

 By Atty. Arnedo S. Valera

In a recent quote circulating widely in media circles, former Supreme Court Justice Conchita Carpio Morales—esteemed for her authorship of the landmark Francisco v. House of Representatives decision—appeared to suggest that the “transmittal of the complaint” to the Committee on Justice remains the operative moment that defines the initiation of impeachment proceedings under Philippine constitutional law. While the former Justice’s voice certainly carries weight, her current view deserves critical and respectful scholarly engagement, especially when juxtaposed with her own jurisprudence and comparative legal doctrines in American constitutional practice.

Let us begin with clarity: the term “initiation” of impeachment has profound constitutional significance. It is not a mere semantic detail but a procedural fulcrum that activates important limitations—chief among them, the one-year bar rule enshrined in Article XI, Section 3(5) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution:

“No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”

The phrase “initiated” thus demands precision, not speculation. The 2003 Supreme Court ruling in Francisco v. House provided exactly that.

The Francisco Doctrine: Filing and Referral

In Francisco v. House of Representatives, the Supreme Court categorically held that an impeachment proceeding is deemed initiated only upon both the filing and referral of a verified complaint to the Committee on Justice. The Court emphasized:

 “An impeachment proceeding is deemed initiated when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.”

This doctrinal formula—filing plus referral—is not a casual observation. It forms part of the ratio decidendi of the case, and is thus binding precedent. To now suggest that “transmittal alone” suffices contradicts both the language and spirit of that ruling.

It is surprising, then, that the very Justice who penned this authoritative decision now appears to espouse a more limited reading that detaches initiation from referral. Respectfully, this revised stance weakens the procedural safeguards that the Constitution intended to erect against political harassment and abuse of the impeachment process.

Why Referral Matters: Legal and Structural Integrity

The referral requirement is not bureaucratic fluff—it is the formal mechanism by which the House of Representatives engages with a verified complaint. Without referral, a complaint merely languishes as a piece of paper in the archives. It has no legal life until the Committee on Justice, acting in its constitutional duty, receives and acts upon it. The dual act of filing and referral is what gives the impeachment process its official character and constitutional weight.

The U.S. Parallel: Congressional Discretion and Political Character

To further illuminate the issue, we may turn briefly to American constitutional jurisprudence, where impeachment has been long exercised under the doctrine of congressional plenary power.

Under Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the House of Representatives has the “sole power of impeachment.” As explained in Jefferson’s Manual and further affirmed in practice, impeachment is initiated upon the filing of a resolution or the start of a formal investigation, regardless of whether a committee referral occurs immediately. The political character of impeachment—recognized in cases like Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)—means that the courts refrain from interfering in procedural disputes, leaving initiation timing largely to congressional discretion.

The lesson here is not to emulate the exact mechanics of the U.S. system, but to understand that each constitutional democracy gives special procedural meaning to “initiation” within its own legal and institutional framework. In the Philippines, the Supreme Court has clearly spoken: initiation is a two-step process, and any attempt to truncate it invites instability and constitutional confusion.

Upholding Judicial Consistency and Constitutional Discipline

To now reinterpret “initiation” as merely the “transmittal” of a complaint—without regard to referral—would reduce the constitutional provision to a paper tiger. Worse, it would contradict a final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court. The doctrine of stare decisis, deeply embedded in our civil law tradition and reinforced by the need for legal predictability, demands that Francisco v. House remain good law until formally overturned.

Moreover, the res judicata character of Francisco makes it part of our living constitutional order. It cannot be casually revised by subsequent opinion, whether academic, political, or even from a former member of the Court. Only the Court, sitting en banc with jurisdiction, can reverse itself—and even then, only for compelling and thoroughly justified reasons.

Let Law Be Law

While respectful debate is the lifeblood of constitutional democracy, we must not allow personal reinterpretations—however distinguished the source—to dilute the meaning of established precedent. The rule of law is not made stronger by revisiting settled doctrine on the basis of momentary preference or political expediency.

“Initiation” means what the Supreme Court said it means: filing and referral. Let us not rewrite the Constitution through press statements or retrospective revisions. If the rule of law is to endure, then its guardians—past and present—must also honor the judgments it has rendered.#

Atty. Arnedo S. Valera is the executive director of the Global Migrant Heritage Foundation and managing attorney at Valera & Associates, a US immigration and anti-discrimination law firm for over 32 years. He holds a master’s degree in International Affairs and International Law and Human Rights from Columbia University and was trained at the International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. He obtained his Bachelor of Laws from Ateneo de Manila University.  He is an AB-Philosophy Major at the University  of Santo Tomas ( UST). He is a professor at San Beda Graduate School of Law (LLM Program), teaching International Security and Alliances.