Why Due Process Still Reigns: A Constitutional Answer to Former SC Justice Azcuna's View on Impeachment

Atty. Arnedo S. Valera

The recent commentary published by Former SC Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna on July 30, 2025, under the title “The Principal Casualty,” raises profound concerns about the Supreme Court’s ruling interpreting the term “initiate” within Article XI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution. His thesis suggests that the Court’s reading of “initiate” undermines the spirit of accountability and disrupts what he sees as the sui generis nature of impeachment proceedings. While the former SC Justice’s concern for public accountability is laudable, his constitutional analysis suffers from significant flaws—both doctrinal and jurisprudential—that warrant clarification.

This brief aims to affirm the critical role of due process, reaffirm the necessity of judicial review, and defend the Court’s textual and structural interpretation of impeachment as firmly grounded in constitutional design, not political compromise.

Due Process Is Not an Optional Virtue

Justice Azcuna appears to imply that due process may yield when impeachment is at stake, reasoning that no deprivation of life, liberty, or property is involved. This claim is not only legally inaccurate—it is dangerous. It overlooks settled principles in both Philippine and American constitutional traditions, where even the removal of one from public office implicates interests that are constitutionally protected.

The landmark Philippine case Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940), still serves as a cornerstone in administrative law, holding that quasi-judicial bodies must observe the rudiments of fair play. Impeachment, although political in form, is adjudicative in function. Its impact—the removal from a constitutionally mandated office—carries consequences far beyond politics. In Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. No. 146710-15 (2001), the Court was unequivocal: even the exercise of political powers must conform to legal and constitutional limits.

This is echoed in U.S. jurisprudence. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), and Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that even non-criminal state actions that affect a person’s profession or entitlement demand procedural safeguards. Political office is a public trust, yes, but it is not a gift subject to arbitrary withdrawal.

Impeachment Is a Constitutional Mechanism, Not an Unchecked Power

Justice Azcuna’s assertion that impeachment occupies a realm above or apart from constitutional limits misreads the very structure of the Constitution. While impeachment is indeed unique in procedure, it remains a creation of constitutional text. It cannot exist beyond the reach of the very charter that brought it into being.

Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution empowers the judiciary to determine grave abuse of discretion committed by any instrumentality of government, including Congress. In Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261 (2003), the Supreme Court emphasized that the House could not interpret the “initiation” clause in a way that subverts its clear purpose—preventing the harassment of officials through multiple impeachment attempts within a year.

The Constitution does not exempt political branches from constitutional compliance simply because their functions carry political implications. In fact, precisely because impeachment is political, constitutional safeguards must be even more vigilant.

Defining “Initiate”: Clarity Rooted in Doctrine

The controversy over the term “initiate” lies at the heart of this debate. The former SC Justice suggests the Supreme Court has redefined the term contrary to earlier precedent. That is inaccurate. The Court has instead affirmed the prevailing doctrine that “initiation” occurs upon the filing and referral of a verified complaint to the House Committee on Justice—just as it was held in Francisco.

If initiation were to occur merely upon filing, without referral, this would open the door to strategic withdrawals and manipulative filings designed to block legitimate impeachment within the one-year prohibition. That reading would defeat the very objective of the limitation. The Court’s decision seeks to prevent such abuse. This is not judicial activism—it is a necessary doctrinal clarification consistent with both precedent and constitutional logic.

Constituent Powers Are Not Beyond Scrutiny

Justice Azcuna invokes the concept of constituent powers to argue that impeachment proceedings, by nature, are immune to judicial oversight. But this overlooks a basic distinction in constitutional theory. Constituent powers refer to the power to frame or amend a constitution. Once a constitution is ratified, all other powers exercised by the government—legislative, executive, or judicial—are derivative and bounded.

Even the U.S. Supreme Court has not hesitated to review executive or legislative conduct when it crosses constitutional boundaries. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the Court required the President to comply with a subpoena—proving that no branch stands above the Constitution.

In the Philippine context, the role of the judiciary is to guard against excess, even by Congress. This is not interference—it is fidelity to the constitutional order.

Checks and Balances Are Not Symbolic

Azcuna’s worry that judicial review of impeachment proceedings would allow justices to shield themselves from removal is misplaced. The judiciary does not try impeachments. It ensures that the rules and boundaries set by the Constitution are observed.

The 1987 Constitution introduced an expanded certiorari jurisdiction precisely to prevent any branch from operating beyond its limits. The Court’s duty is not to favor any branch—but to preserve the integrity of the process.

Accountability cannot come at the cost of legality. Public officers must be held to account, yes—but only through lawful means. Otherwise, the very purpose of impeachment is undermined by procedural abuse.

Fidelity, Not Expediency, Should Guide Us

In responding to Justice Azcuna’s thoughtful yet flawed argument, we must return to first principles. The Constitution is not a suggestion—it is the supreme law. Impeachment, due process, and judicial review are not mutually exclusive; they are interdependent.

Accountability will only thrive when it is pursued lawfully. In safeguarding the integrity of constitutional processes—even those with political flavor—the Court does not undermine democracy; it sustains it.

Let us be clear: no cause, however righteous, justifies the abandonment of constitutional guarantees. In the end, what sustains the Republic is not the loudest call for justice, but the measured, principled application of law.

Atty. Arnedo S. Valera is the executive director of the Global Migrant Heritage Foundation and managing attorney at Valera & Associates, a US immigration and anti-discrimination law firm for over 32 years. He holds a master’s degree in International Affairs and International Law and Human Rights from Columbia University and was trained at the International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. He obtained his Bachelor of Laws from Ateneo de Manila University.  He is an AB-Philosophy Major at the University  of Santo Tomas ( UST). He is a professor at San Beda Graduate School of Law (LLM Program), teaching International Security and Alliances.